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International (cyber)stalking: impediments to investigation and prosecution1
 
 
Suzan van der Aa 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The history of anti-stalking legislation is an excellent example of globalization in itself. 
Within no time the legislative ‘innovation’ of the crime of stalking by the state of California 
was picked up by other states and by other countries all around the world.2 It took less than 
five years after the first criminalization in 1990 before the other fifty American states and the 
District of Colombia had followed the Californian precedent. Quickly the trend spread 
throughout the world and was passed onto several European countries, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and even Japan. Consequently, the conduct has generated more and more 
academic and legislative attention.3
An example of an international stalking case involved a Dutch female victim who 
lived near the Belgian border and who was being harassed by her former Belgian boyfriend.
 What has not been paid much attention to is that 
nowadays – like trends within the legal domain – stalkers and their victims are able to travel 
across national borders just as easily. While sometimes the geographical distance between 
stalker and victim forms a natural impediment to the harassment, there have been cases in 
which the stalking continued despite the separation or – in the case of cyberstalking – where 
stalker and victim had never even met in the offline world.      
4
As appears from the example, the police sometimes shy away from taking action 
because of the international nature of the case. Where the investigation and prosecution of 
stalking already poses various problems on the national level, these difficulties are multiplied 
when an international component comes into play. Inter-jurisdictional difficulties could 
emerge. Which jurisdiction is responsible for regulating the stalking? And how would the 
international investigation and prosecution take shape? Naturally, these problems can be 
witnessed with other crimes that transcend national borders as well. What is unique about 
stalking, however, is the lack of consensus on a definition and the absence of a criminal 
provision in many countries. Where crimes such as the distribution of child pornography can 
count on international support when it comes to the development of international standards, 
the criminalization of stalking in national legislation alone is already controversial. Many 
difficulties arise when different states with a different cultural and legal background have to 
reach an agreement upon the matter. 
 
He kept driving by her house, following her around, sending her e-mails and calling her on 
the phone. Despite the – according to the victim – abundance of evidence, the Dutch police 
told her that ‘nothing could be done’, since the stalking was carried out by a Belgian citizen 
who, furthermore, partly carried out his deviant behaviour from abroad. 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Theo de Roos and Marc Groenhuijsen for reviewing previous drafts of this 
chapter. 
2 According to the Modena report, it was not the state of California that had the scoop on the criminalization of 
stalking in 1990, but it was Denmark that had already criminalized the conduct back in 1933 (Modena Group on 
Stalking, Protecting women from the new crime of stalking: A comparison of legislative approaches within the 
European Union. Final report (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia for the European Commission, 2007), 
p. 79). However, since it was the Californian legislation that inspired the international (legislative) attention for 
the conduct this legislation is used as a point of reference.  
3 A. Groenen, Stalking. Risicofactoren voor fysiek geweld, Antwerpen: Maklu 2006, p. 16.   
4 This example is derived from a victim questionnaire that was carried out by the author within the scope of her 
forthcoming PhD thesis. 
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One form of international stalking that deserves special attention is international 
cyberstalking. Cyberstalking - or the repetitive harassment or threat of an individual through 
the internet or other electronic means of communication5 - has no geographical limitations. 
With the introduction and enormous expansion of the internet, criminals have found a new 
means to carry out their devious behaviour. Crimes such as identity theft, extortion and 
distribution of child pornography that were traditionally perpetrated in the offline world can 
now be witnessed online as well and often to an even larger extent. National boundaries that 
served as a restriction to offline crimes have no meaning on the World Wide Web. The same 
holds true for crimes that have only recently been criminalized like stalking. As a 
consequence, some authors have expressed the need to consider how states can work together 
to counter cases of international cyberstalking.6
The aim of this article is to see what problems arise in the investigation and 
prosecution of international (cyber)stalking and whether some of these problems could be 
solved. In order to answer this question there will first be an assessment of whether the 
problem is extensive and serious enough to justify (inter)national action or regulation (chapter 
2). The United States were the first to recognise that stalking could easily expand beyond state 
borders and in reaction the federal government designed a federal act to enhance the 
investigation and prosecution of interstate stalking. The American anti-stalking act will be 
looked at to see whether it can serve as an example in bridging the differences between 
different jurisdictions (chapter 3). Characteristic for the European situation is that many 
European countries have not criminalized (cyber)stalking at all and those that have all use 
different definitions. The fourth chapter takes stock of the ways in which European countries 
have criminalized the conduct. If we were to design an international approach to counter 
stalking, how would we overcome the current differences in stalking legislation or even the 
absence of legislation and where do we look for common ground? Chapter 5 looks at the 
impediments to investigation and prosecution that arise in a national context and chapter 6 
focuses on the difficulties of dealing with international crime in general and international 
(cyber)stalking in specific. Finally, the Convention on Cybercrime will be analysed to see if it 




2. Prevalence and seriousness of international (cyber)stalking 
 
2.1. International stalking 
 
To date, over 19 years after the state of California enacted its anti-stalking legislation that 
sparked the international trend of criminalizing the conduct, there is still no universally agreed 
upon definition of stalking. Amongst other problems, this also results in varying estimations 
                                                 
5 P. Bocij, ‘Victims of Cyberstalking: An Exploratory Study of Harassment Perpetrated via the Internet’ (2003) 8 
First Monday, 10 <www.firstmonday.org>. In 2004, Bocij proposes the following, more specific definition: ‘A 
group of behaviors in which an individual, group of individuals, or organization uses information and 
communications technology to harass another individual, groups of individuals, or organization. Such behaviors 
may include, but are not limited to, the transmission of threats and false accusations, identify theft, data theft, 
damage to data or equipment, computer monitoring, solicitation of minors for sexual purposes, and any form of 
aggression. Harassment is defined as a course of action that a reasonable person, in possession of the same 
information, would think causes another reasonable person to suffer emotional distress.’ A cyberstalking cases is 
furthermore: ‘[…] one in which the stalker begins to harass the victim via ICT and/or in which most of the 
harassment is based on the use of ICT’ (P. Bocij, Cyberstalking: Harassment in the Internet Age and How to 
Protect Your Family (Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers,  2004), p. 15). 
6 P. Tjaden, ‘Stalking in America: Laws, Research, and Recommendations’ in R.C. Davis, A.J. Lurigio and S. 
Herman (eds.), Victims of Crime (3rd edn, California, Thousand Oaks, 2007), pp. 75-89 at p. 85. 
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on the prevalence of the conduct. In thirteen large-scale studies on stalking prevalence within 
the general population lifetime prevalence estimates range from 4.5 to 23.4 percent of the 
population and last year prevalence rates from 1.6 to almost 6 percent.7
Despite these wide variations, several trends or characteristics have emerged. Even the 
studies that held on to the most restrictive criteria reported a significant proportion of the 
population to be affected by the conduct. Another finding that finds support throughout the 
studies is that, in the general population, women are more likely than men to experiences 
stalking victimization.
 It has affected 
between 7 to 32.4 percent of the adult female population and 2 to 15 percent of the male 
population once in their lives, with a last year involvement of 1 to 9 percent of women and 0.4 
to 8.9 percent of men.  
8 Furthermore, young persons are more at risk to become the victim of 
stalking than older people.9
When it comes to the impact of stalking the high prevalence numbers are especially 
worrying given that this behaviour imposes a great strain on the private lives of the victims. 
Several studies have indicated that victims experience personality changes, suffer from 
insomnia and they often show symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or other 
psychiatric and psychological complaints.
  
10 Thirty percent of female victims and twenty 
percent of male victims sought psychological counselling and seven percent never returned to 
work as a result of the stalking.11 Some victims had to endure profound alterations such as 
relocating to another place or changing identities in order to protect themselves or their loved-
ones.12 According to a study which had studied female murder victims who had been killed 
by intimate partners, 76 percent of the murder victims and 85 percent of the attempted murder 
victims had been stalked by their intimate partners in the year prior to their murders.13
Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned prevalence studies included in their 
research design a question on international stalking so the question as to the prevalence or the 
impact of international stalking remains unanswered. 
  
 
2.2. International cyberstalking 
 
It may not come as a surprise that characterizing and defining the new concept of 
cyberstalking has proven equally difficult as in the case of its offline equivalent. A 
complicating factor in this respect is that there is no consensus on whether cyberstalking 
should be viewed as nothing more than an extension of offline stalking, or whether it should 
be viewed as an entirely new form of deviant behaviour, albeit related to offline stalking.14
                                                 
7 For an overview of the thirteen studies and an estimate of the Dutch prevalence of stalking see S. van der Aa 
and M. Kunst, ‘Prevalence of stalking in the Netherlands’ (2009, forthcoming) International Review of 
Victimology.   
  
8 See B.H. Spitzberg and W.R. Cupach, ‘The state of the art of stalking: Taking stock of the emerging literature’ 
(2007) 12 Aggression and Violent Behavior, 64-86. 
9 For example, R. Purcell, M. Pathé and M.E. Mullen, ‘The prevalence and nature of stalking in the Australian 
community’ (2002) 36 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 1, 114-120; S. Morris, S. Anderson 
and L. Murray, Stalking and harassment in Scotland (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive Social Research, 2002) and 
T. Budd and J. Mattinson, the extent and nature of stalking: Findings from the 1998 British Crime Survey 
(London: Home office, 2000). 
10 For example E. Blaauw, L. Sheridan and F.W.Winkel, ‘Designing Anti-stalking Legislation on the Basis of 
Victims’ Experiences and Psychopathology’ (2002) 2 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 136-145.   
11 Tjaden and N. Thoennes, Stalking in America: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey 
(Washingon, DC: National Institute of Justice and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1998). 
12 Ibid. According to that study 11 percent of the female stalking victims had relocated because of the 
harassment.  
13 J.M. McFarlane, J.C. Campbell, S. Wilt, C.J. Sachs, Y. Ulrich and X. Xu, ‘Stalking and Intimate Partner 
Femicide’ (1999) 3 Homicide Studies, 4, 300-316.  
14 Bocij, Cyberstalking, p. 12. 
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Although worldwide data on the extent of cyberstalking do not yet exist, there is 
increasing empirical evidence that cyberstalking is a serious and growing problem. Estimates 
on the extent of cyber-stalking vary considerably. They range from 474,000 to 18.75 million 
annual cyberstalking victims across the world.15 Still many estimates are based on flawed 
assumptions or unreliable and outdated statistics.16 But even if we depart from the most 
conservative estimate of 474,000 victims a year this still supports the idea that the problem is 
widespread. It is also important to note that at the moment internet has over 1.46 billion users 
worldwide17 on a world population of over 6 billion people and that its growing potential is 
still not exhausted. With the growth of internet, the crime numbers will rise as well. Large 
metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles and New York City have therefore already 
established specialized crime units that investigate and prosecute cases in response to the 
numerous incidents of cyberstalking.18
Cyberstalking is predicted to become even more common than offline stalking, due to 
several crime stimuli of the internet. The internet offers large opportunities to utilize advanced 
computer programs to spread viruses, distribute spam or to hack another person’s computer 
system. Stalkers have no difficulties finding a victim, while the chances of being confronted 
with the consequences of their actions are negligible. For the average internet user, it is not 
very hard to conceal ones identity and data can be altered, moved or deleted within seconds, 
thereby destroying the evidence. Proving that a suspect has committed cyberstalking can cost 
a lot of effort hence the chances of being arrested or sanctioned are small.
  
19
Even though it is often perceived as less serious,
  
20 cyberstalking can cause just as 
much psychological, emotional or economical harm as offline stalking. Of the respondents 
who had been subjected to cyberstalking almost a quarter valued the stress they had 
experienced as a consequence of the stalking with a ten on a ten-point scale.21 Furthermore, 
the posting or otherwise distributing of false information on bulletin boards, chat-rooms or 
through direct e-mails, also known as ‘cyber-smearing’, can even be more harmful than 
equivalent behaviours in the offline world, since information on the internet is accessible to a 
large audience and it often remains accessible for a long period of time.22 Also there have 
been incidents reported of cyberstalking cases that even result in the physical attack of the 
victim. In other words, cyberstalking can have a negative impact on the victim that is similar 
to the consequences of real life stalking. Cybercrime and cyberstalking have even been said to 
cost ‘millions of dollars in computer and network damages to businesses and fear and 
physiological trauma to millions of cyberstalking victims’23
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 47. 
 although – again – this statement 
lacks empirical evidence.   
16 Ibid. 
17 See World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, <www.internetworldstats.com> (Januari 2009). 
18 U.S. Department of Justice, Stalking and Domestic Violence: Report to Congress under the Violence Against 
Women Act (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 2001), p. 7. 
19 Bocij, ‘Victims of Cyberstalking’.  
20 Bocij, Cyberstalking, p. XII of the introduction. The U.S. Attorney General also reports that the lack of 
physical contact may create the misconception that cyberstalking is less serious than offline stalking (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Cyberstalking. A new challenge for law enforcement and industry (Washington, D.C.: 
Report of the Attorney General to the Vice President 1999).  
21 Bocij sent a questionnaire to 169 respondents who were selected by snowball sampling via e-mail. Of this 
sample only one-third had suffered from actual cyberstalking experiences. The design of the study will have a 
bearing on the generalizability of the findings, a fact that the author himself generously admits (Bocij, ‘Victims 
of Cyberstalking’).  
22 Ibid.. 
23 A. R. Roberts and D. Green, ‘Crisis Intervention With Victims Of Violent Crimes’ in R.C. Davis, A.J. Lurigio 
and S. Herman (eds.), Victims of Crime (3rd edn, California, Thousand Oaks, 2007), pp. 255-266 at p. 256. 
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On the prevalence and seriousness of international cyberstalking, when stalker and 
victim reside in different countries or have different nationalities, there is no empirical or even 
anecdotal evidence whatsoever. The existent literature on cyberstalking has mainly been 
restricted to national states only. If the topic is brought up, this happens only in an assessment 
of general notions of procedural law and not in an empirical fashion. For example, many 
authors do recognise that it is difficult or even impossible to prosecute a stalker whose victims 
are located in a foreign country,24
All in all there is an astounding lack of research on the topic. Where the research on 
the prevalence and seriousness of national (cyber)stalking as such is highly speculative 
already, the research on international (cyber)stalking is even non-existent. Despite the 
absence of ‘hard data’ the US government has drafted special legislation to deal with this type 
of crime. 
 but this assessment has not lead to subsequent study or 
contemplation.   
 
 
3. (Cyber)stalking legislation in the United States 
 
In the United States the government quickly recognized the possible multi-jurisdictional 
nature of stalking and the problems that came along with it. Next to the difficulties that may 
derive from international (cyber)stalking the American police and prosecution service have to 
deal with the complexity of a federal system as well. Given the fact that stalking is regulated 
on a state level, this means that there is a concern to harmonize state laws and procedures 
within the United States. The United States opted for a two-track approach to harmonize state 
legislation and to counter interstate (cyber)stalking: first, the creation of a Model Anti-
Stalking Code and second, the adoption of a federal anti-stalking law.   
In 1993, before the majority of the states had drafted anti-stalking legislation, the 
National Institute of Justice developed a model anti-stalking code to encourage states to adopt 
anti-stalking measures themselves and to provide them with a template that was expected to 
withstand the anticipated constitutional challenges.25 As a result many states incorporated 
provisions of the code in their states statutes. Still there are differences between the various 
anti-stalking laws. States differ for example in their anti-stalking legislation as to the type of 
repeated behaviour that is prohibited, whether a threat is required, the reaction of the victim to 
the stalking and the intent or mens rea of the perpetrator.26
Although most (cyber)stalking cases will fall within the jurisdiction of state authorities 
there are instances where state law is inadequate, where questions of jurisdiction arise or 




In 1996, a federal interstate stalking law was enacted that prohibits individuals from 
travelling across a state line with the intent to injure or harass another person.
 State law therefore needed to be supplemented by federal law for cases that did not 
stay within the domain of one single state.  
28
                                                 
24 Bocij, Cyberstalking, p. 172. 
 In 2000, the 
Violence Against Women Act amended the interstate stalking law so that it  would include 
travelling across national borders. It also expanded the statute to cover conduct with the intent 
to kill or intimidate another person. Cyberstalking perpetrated by a stalker who is in a 
25 National Criminal Justice Association, Project to Develop a Model Anti-Stalking Code for States (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1993).  
26 U.S. Department of Justice, Strengthening Antistalking Statutes (OVC Legal Series Bulletin nr.1,  2002).  
27 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to Congress, p.12. 
28 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. 
 6 
different state or tribal jurisdiction than the victim is covered by paragraph 2261A(2). This 
paragraph makes it a federal crime to: 
 
“stalk someone across state, tribal or international lines, using regular mail, e-mail, or the Internet (i.e. 
cyberstalking). The stalker must have the intent to kill or injure the victim, or to place the victim, a 
family member, or a spouse or intimate partner of the victim in fear of death or serious bodily 
injury.”29
 
    
In 2006 an amendment expanded the federal stalking statute to include ‘conduct which causes 
the victim substantial emotional distress’ and that would ‘cover surveillance of a victim by a 
global positioning system’.30
In drafting the federal statute, the federal legislator could have chosen to bridge the 
variations that exist among state stalking laws. One could think of using the strictest definition 
so that the prohibited behaviour was already criminalized in every state. What is remarkable is 
that the federal regulation is in fact not in line with many of the state anti-stalking laws or the 
Model Anti-Stalking Code. In state law stalking is generally defined as ‘the wilful or 
intentional commission of a series of acts that would cause a reasonable person to fear death 
or serious bodily injury and that, in fact, does place the victim in fear of death or serious 
bodily injury’.
  
31 In contrast to the majority of state laws, the federal law does not require an 
actual reaction from the victim to classify conduct as cyberstalking. So the stalking does not 
have to cause the victim to actually fear for death or bodily injury. Furthermore, the federal 
law is a ‘specific intent’ crime, meaning that it requires proof that the stalker intended to 
cause the victim to fear death or personal injury. Many states, on the other hand, handle a 
‘general intent’ requirement, implying that the stalker simply intentionally committed 
prohibited acts without necessarily intending the consequences of those actions.32 On top of 
that, cyberstalking with an inter-jurisdictional component is criminalized even in states where 
cyberstalking as such has not been criminalized at all. In Illinois, Maryland, Hawaii, 
Connecticut and Wisconsin, the anti-stalking statutes all use narrow definitions of stalking 
that involve following, approaching or otherwise maintaining a physical proximity to a 
person.33
The power to impose federal legislation that is not in conformity with state law is 
inherent in the American federal system, but things become more complicated in an 
international context when states are autonomous and have the right to withhold from 
ratification if they do not consent with certain provisions. Before assessing what legislation 
would be most suitable to deal with international stalking in the European – or even in a 
global – context and how this legislation needs to be worded in order for it to succeed, it is 
necessary to first have a look at the way stalking is criminalized in most European member-
states. If there is sufficient common ground, drafting anti-stalking legislation that is widely 
accepted will not be that complicated.    
 Cyberstalking that is not supplemented with behaviour that has a connexion with the 
offline world is not subjected to penalty in those states.  
                                                 
29 <http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/factsh1/factsh1.html>. 
30 National Center for Victims of Crime, The Model Stalking Code Revisited: Responding to the New Realities of 
Stalking (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Victims of Crime, 2007), p. 11 (18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) and 
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A)). 
31 U.S. Department of Justice, Strenghtening Antistalking Statutes. This is in conformity with Section 2 of the 
Model Anti-Stalking Code. 
32 For more information on the division between ‘specific intent crimes’ and ‘general intent crimes’ see the 
National Center for Victims of Crime, Model Stalking Code Revisited, p. 32. For that matter, the new Model 
Stalking Code as drafted by the National Center for Victims of Crime prefers ‘general intent’ over ‘specific 
intent’ just as the 1993 Model Anti-Stalking Code (p. 32-33).  




4. (Cyber)stalking legislation in Europe 
 
In 2007 a report was published that contained the results of a project aimed at collecting and 
analysing the legal regulations on stalking across the European Member States.34 The report 
paints a picture of a highly differentiated manner to tackle the problem of stalking across 
Europe. The differences already begin with the term ‘stalking’. Where the American states at 
least share common words for the conduct, the - non Anglo-Saxon - European Member States 
use native words or expressions that fully or only partially cover the concept of stalking. More 
importantly, in contrast to the United States where all states have criminalized stalking, only 8 
out of the 25 European countries have a specific law against stalking.35 Of the 17 countries 
that had not enacted an anti-stalking law, half indicated that they felt the need to pass one, but 
the other half did not think this was necessary.36
When we focus on the Member States that have enacted specific laws to counter 
stalking, there is still an apparent lack of common ground. Many of the American laws were 
in one way or another based on or inspired by the Model Anti-Stalking Code, thereby sharing 
certain common features, but the European countries could not depart from an exemplary 
code. As a result, anti-stalking acts differ on various aspects: where the reaction of the victim 
is a qualifying element of the offence of stalking in the UK, Ireland and Malta, it is not 
included in the definition of stalking in Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands; where certain 
jurisdictions require the perpetrator to have had ‘intent’, others do not think this a constituent 
of stalking at all, not even in the sense of ‘general intent’; where Belgian and Austrian judges 
only have the penalty of imprisonment at their disposal, the other countries have opened up 
the possibility of imposing a fine as well or instead; where Germany and Austria have clearly 
specified the behaviours of the stalker that represent stalking, other jurisdictions make use of 
more generic definitions without an enumeration of the possible stalking acts; and where most 
Member States will not define a conduct as stalking unless it consists of a course of conduct 
of at least two occasions, in Belgium and Malta a single incident can suffice.  
 These Member-States were already satisfied 
with the existent legislation or society did not perceive stalking as a problem.   
 
 
Table 1: Stalking legislation in 8 European countries 
Countries Intent of the 
perpetrator 
Anxiety / fear/ 
expectation of 
violence by the 
victim  
Imprisonment 
Austria - - Max. 1 year 
Belgium Yes - Max. 2 years 
Denmark Yes Yes Max. 2 years 
                                                 
34 Modena Group on Stalking, Protecting women 
35 Actually with the recent Italian criminalization there are now 9 countries that have enacted specific anti-
stalking legislation.. 
36 The countries that felt the need to pass anti-stalking legislation were Italy, Portugal, Greece, Sweden, Finland, 
Cyprus and Luxembourg. The countries that did not feel this necessity were Estonia, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Spain and Slovenia (Modena Group on Stalking, Protecting women, p. 12). 
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Germany Yes Yes Max. 10 years 
Ireland - Yes Max. 7 years 
Malta - Yes Max. 6 months 
Netherlands Yes - Max. 3 years 
United Kingdom - Yes Max. 5 years 
 
Certain differences only appear to be superficial. In Belgium, for example, nobody has ever 
been charged with or convicted for stalking because of one single incident.37 Other 
differences, however, are more substantial. It appears as if two distinct models have 
emerged.38 On the one hand there is the model of the English-speaking countries with their 
emphasis on the reaction of the victim and on the other hand there is the continental European 
model which, especially in the most recent laws, seems to focus on the stalker’s ways of 
conduct and his or her intentions. In contrast to the UK, Ireland and Malta, the reaction of the 
victim is not a qualifying element of the crime of stalking in Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark and the Netherlands. These countries appear to place more emphasis on the ‘types 
of behaviour and/or the intent of the stalker or on concepts such as privacy or the disturbance 
of the peace’.39
These differences may become less apparent in the future. In the U.S. more and more 
states are adopting anti-stalking legislation in which the victim is no longer supposed to have 
suffered a certain level of fear – e.g. fear of bodily injury or death - but where it suffices if a 
reasonable person would suffer emotional stress, because of the harassment. Furthermore, a 
number of courts have held that this emotional distress no longer needs to be proven by 
independent expert testimony.
 In other words, variations in legislation also appear to derive from even more 
substantial differences, namely different opinions on what is so deviant about stalking 
behaviour and why it deserves punishment and criminalization in the first place. The 
continental anti-stalking laws stand out for the great importance given to the right to privacy, 
whereas the Anglo-Saxon countries, with their emphasis on anxiety of the victim seem to take 
the right to live without fear as a justification for anti-stalking legislation.  
40
 
 It seems as if the focus on the mental effects of a victim is 
slowly sliding towards a more objective standard. 
 
5. Investigation and prosecution of (cyber)stalking on a national level 
 
The national investigation and prosecution of stalking appears problematic and it seems as if 
the difficulties generally arise in an early stage of the criminal justice procedure. Several 
publications paint a picture of a criminal justice practice defined by low reporting and high 
attrition rates.41
                                                 
37 This information was given to the author during a personal conversation with Wim d’Haese - a Belgian Chief 
of Police of the Leuven district. 
 On top of that, anecdotal evidence suggests that a part of the victims are 
38 Modena Group on Stalking, Protecting women, p. 69. 
39 Ibid., p. 70. 
40 National Center for Victims of Crime, Model Stalking Code Revisited, p. 48. 
41 For example, R.-M. Bruynooghe, A. Vandenberk, L. Verhaegen, A. Colemont and I. Hens, Geweld in het 
meervoud: Een kwalitatieve benadering van de betekenissen rond geweldvormen in België 
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dispatched in an even earlier stage. Victim Support Netherlands estimates that at least 25% of 
the stalking victims are involuntary sent away from the police station without even having a 
registration taken down, let alone a report.42
Another recurring theme is the inactiveness on the part of the police.
  
43 Taking into 
account that only a part of the stalking cases is reported to the police, it is remarkable that in a 
significant part of the reported cases the police remain inactive. In the United States, about 
half of the stalking incidents were reported to the police, however in 18.9% of these cases the 
police did nothing.44
The disinclination of law enforcement officers to intervene may possibly be caused by 
the high attrition rate due to the withdrawal of the complaint by the victim.
  
45
A second explanation for police inaction could lie in the perceived difficulty to 
procure sufficient evidence.
 As in other cases 
of interpersonal violence, the police sometimes believe that arresting the offender is a waste 
of time, because victims are inclined to drop charges.  
46
Finally, the police sometimes seem to trivialize stalking. In a German study two-third 
of the 48 victims who had been into contact with the police were very satisfied with their 
work, but only half of the respondents felt being taken seriously.
 The collection of evidence in criminal cases needs to live up to 
a higher standard than the one used in civil law suits. Criminal proceedings are encumbered 
by constitutional protections such as due process of law and proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
Given the ongoing and often varying pursuit tactics, the thin line between legal and illegal 
behaviour, the lack of obvious injury, and the unpredictable nature of stalking, police and 
public prosecution may believe the evidentiary threshold too high in many stalking cases.  
47 In a larger study of 190 
victims the result was even more sobering: 73% did not feel being taken seriously by the 
police and 86% thought that the steps that were taken were insufficient.48 A reason for the 
lack of proper treatment may be found in the disinclination to acknowledge stalking as a 
genuine crime worthy of punishment.49 Stalking incidents are dismissed as ‘only domestic’ or 
as private matters in the relational sphere that are inappropriate for legal intervention.50
Also in the experience of the National Center for Victims of Crime stalkers often ‘get 
away’ with their criminal behaviour, because the burden of proof is too high, because stalking 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
(Diepenbeek/Louvain-la-Neuve: SEIN, 2003) and A. Groenen, Stalking: Risicofactoren voor fysiek geweld 
(Antwerpen/Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2006). 
42 This estimation was expressed during a personal conversation of the author with Mrs Marie-Louise Janssen-
Brouwer, the former research director of the organization. Some of the victims that had filled out the 
questionnaire as referred to in note 4 confirmed that they had been sent away without having a registration taken 
down. .     
43 For example, E. Finch, The criminalisation of stalking: Constructing the problem and evaluating the solution 
(London: Cavendish, 2001) and Morris, Anderson and Murray, Stalking and harassment in Scotland. 
44 Tjaden & Thoennes, Stalking in America. 
45 Finch, Criminalisation of stalking. 
46 For instance, K.L. Attinello, ‘Anti-stalking legislation: A comparison of traditional remedies available for 
victims of harassment versus California Penal Code Section 646.9 (California Anti-Stalking Law)’ (1993) 24 
Pacific Law Journal, 4, 1945-1980; Groenen, Stalking and M. Malsch, De Wet Belaging: Totstandkoming en 
toepassing (Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, 2004). 
47 Bettermann in J. Hoffmann, ‘Stalking: Polizeiliche Prävention und Krisenmanagement’ (2003) 12 
Kriminalistik, 726-731. 
48 Hoffmann, ‘Stalking’. 
49 M. Rupp, Rechtstatsächliche Untersuchung zum Gewaltschutzgesetz: Zusammenfassung: Ein Überblick über 
die Ergebnisse allerTeilstudien (2005, retrieved May 9, 2008, from Bundesministerium der Justiz website: 
http://www.bmj.bund.de). 
50 Morris, Anderson and Murray, Stalking and harassment in Scotland and B.H. Spitzberg, ‘The tactical 
topography of stalking victimization and management’ (2002) 3 Trauma, Violence and Abuse, 261-288. 
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is only a misdemeanour crime, because many stalking behaviours are viewed as harmless and 
because current state laws do not address the full range of stalking behaviours.51
 For a crime in which it is already hard to have the national police take an interest, 
initiating an international investigation and prosecution could be a significant problem. Next 
to the difficulties of interesting the local police to take charge, which problems could arise in 
an international context? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to have a look at 








One of the issues that always needs to be addressed in cases of cross-border crimes is the 
question of jurisdiction. Which country has the right to prosecute and convict suspects and, if 
more than one country has jurisdiction, which claim shall prevail?  
The establishment of jurisdiction is a domestic affair. Each country decides for itself 
whether it has jurisdiction or not. Given that not every country uses the same standards for 
exercising jurisdiction, this can lead to two sorts of jurisdictional conflicts: negative and 
positive ones. A negative jurisdictional conflict arises when no particular country claims 
jurisdiction. One reason for not claiming jurisdiction may lie in the absence of domestic 
legislation that establishes jurisdiction over the conduct. Another reason to abstain from 
claiming jurisdiction could lie in the insignificance of the harm done to other countries or in 
the lack of means or the unwillingness to prosecute of the country in which the perpetrator 
resides.52 This results in the impunity of the perpetrator. The exact opposite holds true for 
positive jurisdictional conflicts, i.e., when several jurisdictions seek to prosecute a criminal at 
the same time based on the same course of conduct.53 This situation raises the danger of over-
criminalization of activities and double jeopardy.54
Traditional jurisdiction provisions are based on the principle of territoriality. This 
entails that ‘[a] nation (or a state) had jurisdiction to prescribe what was and was not proper 
conduct within its physical territory and had jurisdiction to enforce prescriptions against 
actors whose unlawful conduct had occurred within its territory’.
 
55 Although many countries 
have expanded their jurisdiction provisions over the past few decades to include other factors 
such as nationality of the perpetrator, nationality of the victim or universality as well, the 
principle of territoriality remains the normal basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.56
The principle of territoriality is usually understood to include the ‘location of the act’ 
only. Jurisdiction is based upon a person having been physically present within a country’s 
territory at the time the offense was committed. If a country would hold on to the principle of 
territoriality, this could seriously hamper prosecution and conviction of international 
  
                                                 
51 National Center for Victims of Crime, Model Stalking Code Revisited, p. 17. 
52 B.-J. Koops and S. W. Brenner, ‘Cybercrime jurisdiction – An introduction’ in B.-J. Koops and S. W. Brenner 
(eds.), Cybercrime and Jurisdiction: A Global Survey (Den Haag: T.M.C. Asser Press, (IT & Law 11), 2006, pp. 
1-8 at p.6. Technically, it is incorrect to refer to these cases as negative jurisdictional conflicts, since the conflict 
does not derive from a lack of jurisdiction.   
53 A positive jurisdictional conflict is ‘(…) a situation in which more than one country claims jurisdiction over a 
perpetrator based on the same general course of conduct.’ (S.W. Brenner, ‘The next step: Prioritizing 
jurisdiction’ in Koops and Brenner, Cybercrime and Jurisdiction, pp. 327-349 at p. 328) 
54 N. Cox, ‘Cybercrime and jurisdiction in New Zealand’ in Koops and Brenner, Cybercrime and Jurisdiction, 
pp. 273-291 at p. 289-290. 
55 Koops and Brenner, ‘Cybercrime jurisdiction’, p. 4-5. 
56 Ibid. 
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(cyber)stalking. Take the case where a person (A) resides in a country that adheres to the 
territoriality principle in which only the ‘location of the act’ constitutes jurisdiction. Imagine 
that this person is stalked through the internet by perpetrator (B) who lives in a different 
country and who exclusively operates from his home country. If B’s country of residence is 
unwilling to prosecute the perpetrator, then A would be left empty-handed, despite the 
possible presence of anti-stalking legislation in his or her own country. In practice, this 
problem appears to become more and more obsolete, since the principle of ubiquity – the 
principle that takes the location of the act and the location of the result as constituents of 
jurisdiction - has been adopted by many states over the past fifty years. It is expected to 
become ‘the dominant criterion among countries that belong to the civil-law tradition.’57
When it comes to the risks of concurrent jurisdiction, there are probably fewer 
difficulties. First of all, conflicts of jurisdiction are very rare and when they occurred in the 
past they were always solved at a practical level. The decisive consideration usually was 
which jurisdiction had the best chances ‘for successful prosecution and adjudication of the 
particular case’.
 
However, until all countries pass similar legislation the risk of negative jurisdictional conflict 
remains.  
58 It seems that states take on a very pragmatic approach to resolve positive 
jurisdictional conflicts. In the past, when conflicts of this nature arose in cases of high-sea 
piracy, the state that apprehended the pirates was automatically granted jurisdiction.59 It is not 
for nothing that the Convention on Cybercrime trusts signatory states to solve situations of 
multiple jurisdiction informally.60
Some authors have wondered whether international cybercrimes – a category that 
would include international cyberstalking – deserve specific jurisdiction legislation, since the 
territorial and the ubiquity criterion may pose difficulties in the immaterial world of the 
internet. On whose ‘territory’ is a cybercrime supposed to have taken place if the crime 
consists of ‘immaterial bits and bytes’ that may travel arbitrarily around the world?
 There are no indications to presume that things would go 
differently in cases of international stalking.  
61 And 
whose claims should be given priority if for example a virus infects computers in numerous 
countries? Still, these difficulties seem of less importance when stalking is concerned. In most 
cyberstalking cases there is often only one identifiable offender operating from behind a 
computer in a certain country and one identifiable victim receiving the messages in another 
country.62
                                                 
57 R. Zúñiga and F. Londoño, ‘Cybercrime and jurisdiction in Chile’ in Koops and Brenner, Cybercrime and 
Jurisdiction, pp. 141-155 at p. 152. 
 This generally leads to an easily determinable location of the criminal act and a just 
as easily determinable location of the result, namely the country from which the messages 
were sent and the country in which the harassing e-mails were received and where the victim, 
as a consequence, experienced the harassment. International stalking cases therefore usually 
do not involve more than two countries. It is highly theoretical to presume that the countries 
whose local internet switches accidentally have processed the online data would claim 
jurisdiction, given that ‘a nation can only exercise jurisdiction to prescribe when the exercise 
58 S.W. Brenner, ‘The next step’, p. 330. 
59 Ibid., p. 333-334.  
60 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest, 23 November 2001, ETS No 185, into force 1 July 
2004, Article 22(5). 
61 Koops and Brenner, ‘Cybercrime jurisdiction’, p. 2. 
62 In order not to complicate matters further the possibility that offender and victim are continuously travelling or 
relocating around the world is not considered. Neither is the possibility that a group of stalkers from different 
countries harasses only one single victim, as might be the case with so-called ‘solicited stalking’ or ‘stalking by 
proxy’, in which one person instigates other people to harass a victim, e.g., by placing an appeal on a weblog or 
an internet forum.   
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of such jurisdiction is reasonable’.63
 
 As explained before, both countries involved will 
probably be pragmatic enough to ascertain the forum that has the closest nexus to the case. On 
top of that, given the lack of interest that many countries have shown in criminalizing stalking 
or – when criminalized – in investigating and prosecuting the case, the problem most likely to 
occur will not be a multitude of countries ‘fighting’ over a stalking case, but a striking 
absence of countries with a prosecutorial desire. As it is, the ubiquity theory seems sufficient 
and easily applicable in cases of stalking.  
6.2. Extradition 
 
When (cyber)stalking has an international component, the collection of evidence and the 
extradition or surrender of the suspect will require assistance from foreign agencies. In the 
international community this assistance is often laid down in multi- or unilateral treaties that 
describe in which cases and to what extent assistance will be given and under which 
circumstances the gathered evidence or the fugitive suspects or convicts will be handed over 
to the requesting authorities.  
Within traditional extradition procedures the requesting state has to submit a request 
for extradition to the appropriate authorities with a reference to the relevant legal provisions 
and an accurate legal description of the offence for which extradition is requested.64 The 
requested state can judge on the basis of this information whether the fact meets the principle 
of dual criminality – the principle that extradition will only occur if both the requesting and 
the executing country recognize the behaviour as a crime. Usually, extradition schemes 
require an ‘aggravated double criminality’,65 which means that the fact not only has to be 
criminalized in the requested country, but also that the maximum penalty in both countries 
consists of at least one year imprisonment.66 When the extradition is requested for the 
execution of a verdict, the treaties furthermore require that the sentence carries at least a four 
months imprisonment. As regards dual criminality, it is not required that the criminal 
provision of the requesting state has the same qualification as the one in the requested state. It 
is only relevant whether the provision basically protects the same right.67 In other words, 
extradition involves the conduct rather than the specific elements of the criminal provision. 
This requirement needs to be interpreted broadly.68
In stalking cases the dual criminality requirement poses several difficulties. The most 
obvious problem is that stalking as such is not criminalized in many countries, thereby already 
seriously hampering the fulfilment of the principle of dual criminality. And in case both 
countries do have anti-stalking legislation, the additional requirement of a maximum penalty 
of one year could be problematic as well. Malta, for example, punishes stalking behaviour 
with a maximum imprisonment of only 6 months. Furthermore, when extradition is requested 
in order to execute a verdict, the lenient attitude of most judges will make the four months 
imprisonment threshold practically unfeasible. Finally, although dual criminality does not 
require the same qualifications or even the same wordings of the anti-stalking provision in 
 
                                                 
63 Koops and Brenner, ‘Cybercrime jurisdiction’, p. 5. 
64 For example, art. 12 European Convention on Extradition, Paris, 13 December 1957, in force 18 April 1960, 
ETS 24. 
65 V.H. Glerum and N. Rozemond, ‘Overlevering en uitlevering’ in Sliedregt, Sjöcrona and Orie, Handboek 
Internationaal Strafrecht, pp. 139-244 at p. 196. 
66 For instance, article 5 (1) subparagraph a of the Dutch Extradition Act (Uitleveringswet). The minimum of one 
year imprisonment is not required for extradition to member states of the European Union if treaties between the 
Netherlands and those member states prescribe a different maximum penalty (article 6 (1) Dutch Extradition 
Act).     
67 At least, according to the Dutch Supreme Court (HR 30 augustus 2004, NJ 2004, 552).  
68 HR 30 augustus 2005, NJ 2005, 541.  
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both countries, the requirement that the provisions basically need to protect the same right 
may prove to be precarious nevertheless. If one country has implemented anti-stalking 
legislation in order to protect a person’s privacy, whereas the other country was 
predominantly motivated by the desire to guarantee its citizens a life free from anxiety and 
fear, than even a broad interpretation of dual criminality may fail to bridge the differences.      
With the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and the expiration of the 
implementation deadline on the first of January 2004 the classical extradition procedures 
between the Member States of the European Union were replaced by a faster and simpler 
surrender procedure.69 One implication of this is that instead of requesting cooperation, 
member-states are now able to order assistance. The Member States are in principle under the 
obligation to cooperate when requested by another Member State. so the requirement of dual 
criminality is seriously restricted. The warrant may be issued if the person whose return is 
desired is accused of an offence for which the maximum penalty in the issuing country is at 
least a year in prison, or if he or she has been sentenced to a prison term of at least four 
months.70
Especially the abolishment of the dual criminality principle simplifies procedures. 
However, the dual criminality principle is only abolished for thirty-two categories of offences 
that are punishable in the issuing Member State with a prison term of at least three years.
  
71 
Although the list of offences does contain acts that may form part of the stalking, like 
computer-related crime, rape and grievous bodily, stalking as such is not included. This 
means that the extradition of stalkers remains subjected to the condition that stalking is an 
offence under the law of the executing Member State.72 In the Netherlands, as in most other 
countries, the principle of dual criminality reapplies again.73
The EAW is only applicable to member-states of the European Union. For countries 
and states that do not belong to this legal domain, the European Convention on Extradition of 
1957 may apply. Although the requirement of dual criminality is also no longer explicitly 
mentioned in the European Convention on Extradition one can deduce from the many 
reservations that states are still reluctant to extradite citizens or to submerge them to foreign 
coercive means or punishment when the conduct under investigation is not considered 




 So when the conduct is not criminalized in both the requesting 
and the assisting country or, in other words, when the requirement of dual criminality is not 
met, these treaties are often not applicable.  
6.3. International legal assistance 
 
At times the collection of evidence in stalking cases can be laborious. For example, in order to 
link the cyberstalker with the crime it is necessary to identify the computer system from 
which the harassing messages were sent. In case this system is unknown, one needs to follow 
the trail from the computer of the victim back to the stalker’s system. Sometimes information 
                                                 
69 M.J. Borgers and J.M. Sjöcrona, ‘Europees straf(proces)recht’ in E. van Sliedregt, J.M. Sjöcrona and A.M.M. 
Orie (eds.) Handboek Internationaal Strafrecht: Schets van het Europese en Internationale Strafrecht (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 2008) pp. 93-137at p. 117. 
70 Ibid. art. 2 (1) subparagraph 1.   
71 Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant. 
72 Ibid. article 2 (4). 
73 Article 7 (1) subparagraph 2 Dutch Surrender Act (Overleveringswet).      
74 Some countries, such as Brazil, as a rule refuse to extradite their citizens (R. Chacon de Albuquerque, 
‘Cybercrime and jurisdiction in Brazil: From extraterritorial to ultraterritorial jurisdiction’, in Koops and 
Brenner, Cybercrime and Jurisdiction, pp. 111-140 at p. 129). And Japan only ratified two extradition treaties; 
with the U.S. and Korea (P.C. Reich, ‘Cybercrime and jurisdiction in Japan’, in Koops and Brenner, Cybercrime 
and Jurisdiction, pp. 241-255 at p. 252). 
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that was stored by service providers is needed to identify the source. Once the computer 
system is identified and located, investigation and prosecution agencies need to prove that it 
was the suspect who sent the prohibited e-mails or who posted the slander on a bulletin board. 
Especially when perpetrator and victim are located in different jurisdictions, the legal 
assistance of foreign police officers or prosecutors can be required. Next to the extradition, 
international cooperation in criminal cases can therefore exist of carrying out an investigation 
or executing compulsory powers such as the execution of a search warrant, the taping of 
confidential telecommunication or the seizure of goods.  
There exist two basic forms of international legal assistance, i.e., informal and formal 
assistance. The first, sometimes referred to as ‘investigator-to-investigator assistance’,75 
occurs when investigators share information and provide assistance to each other without 
prior legal arrangements thereto. When the information sought is publicly available, this is an 
easy option, but when coercive powers are invoked, the cooperation will have to be based on 
formal legal assistance regimes under international law. Within formal international legal 
assistance one can distinguish between a) cooperation based on the traditional legal assistance 
on request under international law or b) cooperation based on the execution of an order based 
on an EU instrument of mutual recognition. Traditional schemes of international legal 
assistance depart from the law of the requested state, whereas mutual recognition co-
operations depart from the law of the requesting country in determining whether a request for 
legal assistance can and will be followed up.76 Much is also dependent on the attitude of a 
certain country towards international legal assistance and international political relations. In 
the Netherlands nearly every request for legal assistance is complied with. The rule applies 
that ‘whatever is allowed under national law, that is in principle allowed under mutual legal 
assistance as well’.77 In other countries, providing help to foreign requesting authorities is not 
standard practice. International co-operation in Chile is, for instance, rare and Japan has only 
ratified one bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty.78
 Although informal assistance is the norm – judicial authorities are said to exchange 
information on a large scale
  
79 - in (cyber)stalking cases informal requests are probably less 
useful, since the evidence required often involves coercive powers which can only be 
obtained through formal means.80 An investigation may involve the seizure of goods (e.g., a 
server) or the disclosure of information by a foreign communication service provider. Even 
though legal assistance treaties generally require that states afford each other mutual 
assistance to the widest extent possible, the process of formal mutual assistance is 
‘notoriously slow and bureaucratic’.81
There are, however, tendencies to make mutual legal assistance more efficient and less 
time-consuming. Where domestic laws or treaties may require dual criminality as a 
precondition for mutual assistance, the modern trend is to eliminate the principle of dual 
criminality to a large extent.
  
82
                                                 
75 G. Urbas and P. Grabosky, ‘Cybercrime and jurisdiction in Australia’, in Koops and Brenner, Cybercrime and 
Jurisdiction, pp. 47-69 at p. 65. 
 The Council Framework Decision on the European evidence 
76 J.M. Reijntjes, M.R.B. Mos and J.M. Sjöcrona, ‘Wederzijdse rechtshulp’, in Van Sliedregt, Sjöcrona and Orie, 
Handboek Internationaal Strafrecht, pp. 245-301 at p. 296. 
77 Ibid., p. 246. 
78 Chile (Zúñiga and Londoño, ‘Cybercrime and jurisdiction in Chile’, p. 154) and Japan (Reich, ‘Cybercrime 
and jurisdiction in Japan’, p. 252). 
79 J.-H. Lee ‘Cybercrime and jurisdiction in the Republic of Korea’ in Koops and Brenner, Cybercrime and 
Jurisdiction pp. 257-272 at p. 266. 
80 I. Walden, ‘Cybercrime and jurisdiction in United Kingdom’, in Koops and Brenner, Cybercrime and 
Jurisdiction, pp. 293-311 at p. 307. 
81 Urbas and Grabosky, ‘Cybercrime and jurisdiction in Australia’, p. 65. 
82 Reijntjes, Mos and Sjöcrona, ‘Wederzijdse rechtshulp’, p. 291.  
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warrant is a good example of this.83
 
 Together with the time limits that are set on mutual 
cooperation, the absence of dual criminality will accelerate and facilitate cross-border 
evidence collection. The Convention on Cybercrime is also in favour of eliminating dual 
criminality when it comes to the preservation of traffic data, because the preservation of 
traffic data is not considered that intrusive and because the establishment of dual criminality 
could take up a lot of time during which evidence may be destroyed. However, when 
requested for the seizure of goods, the principle of dual criminality generally still applies, 
with all the difficulties that were already touched upon in 6.2.   
 
7. Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime  
 
So when certain behaviour is not criminalized in both the requesting and the assisting country 
extradition treaties are often not applicable. And when there exists no general or specific 
treaty between two countries, the investigation and prosecution of international crime is 
similarly hindered. Recognizing these issues, the Council of Europe drafted an international 
convention on cybercrime that would facilitate and stimulate the international investigation 
and prosecution of cybercrimes.     
In response to the growing international concern over threats posed by computer-
related crimes, the Council of Europe has published several studies and recommendations to 
address the need for new laws in this field. In July 2004 the joint efforts to combat computer-
crimes resulted in the coming into force of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 
the first - and to date only - binding international treaty on the subject. The convention 
provides a framework for international co-operation and it provides guidelines for 
governments who want to criminalize the conduct. Although the convention was developed 
within the framework of the Council of Europe, the convention is open to signature by non-
European states as well. According to the status on 1 January 2009 the Convention was signed 
by 23 countries and ratified by another 23.84
The aims of the convention are to harmonize cyber crime legislation; to harmonize 
criminal procedural legislation to gather electronic evidence and to facilitate international 
cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of computer crimes. In order to remove or 
minimize procedural and jurisdictional obstacles, the ratifying countries are required to 1) 
establish certain substantive offences in the area of cyber crime, 2) to adopt domestic 
procedural laws to investigate and prosecute computer crimes and 3) to provide a solid basis 
for international law enforcement cooperation in investigating and prosecuting these crimes.   
 Apart from the European Member States, 
important countries such as the United States of America, Japan, Canada and South Africa 
have also signed – and in the case of the US ratified – the Convention. This implies that the 
countries with the highest grade of IT-penetration are already party to the Convention. Also 
several states that did not sign have voluntarily adopted (parts) of the Convention in their 
national legislation.    
To some of the provisions in the Convention there is room for ample reservations. The 
reason for this is that states differ significantly in which sort of behaviour they regard as 
serious or worthy of punishment. The provisions on child pornography, for example, are 
subjected to reservations from the United States, because of the first amendment, but also 
from state parties such as Japan, where child pornography is not as reprehensible as in most 
                                                 
83 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence warrant for the 
purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, OJ 2008, No. L350, 
30 December 2008. 
84 This information can be found by searching for the Convention on Cybercrime on 
<www.conventions.coe.int>.  
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western countries.85 Furthermore, the national definitions of, for example, forgery vary 
greatly.86
Another manifestation of the legal differences that had to be bridged was the fact that 
certain behaviours were not criminalized at all. As the explanatory report already indicates, 
the committee only included a list of offences on which consensus could be reached. The 
committee discussed the inclusion of other offences, such as ‘cyber-squatting’,
 As a result, the offences in the Convention are represented by a common minimal 
standard that states can extend upon in their domestic law.  
87 but given the 
lack of support in favour of criminalization, they discarded them again. The only exception to 
this rule was the content-related offence of distributing racist propaganda through computer 
systems. Many delegations were strongly in favour of such criminalization, but some 
expressed concerns regarding the possible damage it could do to the freedom of expression. 
Due to the complexity of the issue, consensus could not be reached. However, instead of 
discarding the topic altogether, the committee decided to refer the issue to the European 
Committee on Crime Problems who, in turn, were to draft an additional protocol to the 
Convention.88
Whether cyberstalking was discussed and explicitly rejected cannot be distinguished 
from the explanatory report, since it makes no mention of it. According to judge Stein 
Schjølberg, a member of the High Level Expert Group that drafted the Convention, 
cyberstalking was indeed not considered as part of the recommendations at all.
  
89 The topic of 
cyberstalking was never even brought up during the negotiations, since it had not raised a 
great deal of awareness. The Convention does criminalize certain behaviour that can 
constitute international cyberstalking. If the stalker illegally gains access to the victim’s 
computer (‘hacking’); illegally intercepts e-mails or other electronic data transfer; 
intentionally inflicts damage on the data stored in the computer of the victim; or sabotages his 
or her computer then this behaviour is covered by the Convention.90
So apart from the situation where the stalker employs tactics that are explicitly 
prohibited in its text, the Convention on Cybercrime does not offer any stimulus to signatory 
states to criminalise harassment through the internet or other means of telecommunication. 
This is a missed opportunity, since an inspiring and harmonizing effect could be expected 
from inclusion. One of the aims of the Convention is to bring national criminal political goals 
in the area of cybercrime closer to each other. As long as cyberstalking is not on the political 
agenda of a substantial part of the signatory countries, the chances of ever having 
cyberstalking included – albeit in the form of an additional protocol - are small.  
 Just as vandalism, threat 
and battering were subjected to penalty long before the Californian legislator had even heard 
of the social construct of stalking, so are certain aspects of cyberstalking prohibited in the 
Convention as well. But just as in the offline world, these miscellaneous incidents often do 
not cover stalking in its entirety, they do not cover the repetitiveness that victims find so 
disturbing and they do not cover some of the most alarming behaviours such as the sending of 





                                                 
85 Kaspersen, 2004. 
86 Explanatory Report of the Convention on Cybercrime, consideration 82. 
87 Ibid. consideration 42. 
88 Ibid. consideration 35. 
89 This information was given to the author during an e-mail conversation with judge Schjølberg. 
90 Convention on Cybercrime, articles 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
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Although there is no exact estimate of the prevalence of international (cyber)stalking as 
such,91 the fact that there is or will be a problem seems apparent. Even if the possibility of 
international cyberstalking may seem rather theoretical to date, developments like Youtube, 
Hyves and SecondLife have a more international character and users are bound to come into 
contact with people of different nationalities. Currently, there is no universal protection 
against (cyber)stalking,92
There appear to be four impediments to the international investigation and prosecution 
of (cyber)stalking. First, there are discrepancies between different jurisdictions as to what 
conduct is criminalized and what not. Sovereign states are allowed to design their criminal 
laws in the way they see fit and therefore, a certain conduct can be prohibited in one country, 
while it is perfectly legal in another. As a result, (cyber)stalkers can be protected under the 
law of the state in which they reside, while their harassment can have an effect on the territory 
of a state that does prohibit the behaviour. The second problem is that the criminal provisions 
in states that have criminalized (cyber)stalking are not in accordance with each other. In some 
states the reaction of the victim is a constitutive element of the crime, others require specific 
or general intent on the part of the stalker and yet others place emphasis on a list with specific 
stalking behaviours. As a result of the first two discrepancies, international co-operation can 
be complicated. This is the third problem. Given the international nature of certain stalking 
cases, it is crucial that law enforcement agents can call in the assistance of colleagues in other 
countries. Criminal investigators are generally only allowed to exercise their investigative 
authorities within the state boundaries unless they have permission to expand their search to 
other territories and the same goes for foreign investigators. Due to the aforementioned 
divergences the principle of dual criminality could form a barrier for extradition and 
sometimes for international legal assistance as well. The biggest problem, however, is the 
danger of negative jurisdictional conflicts, where the stalker gets away with impunity, because 
none of the countries involved claims jurisdiction. It is often already a delicate task to have 
policemen take an interest in stalking matters when the conduct takes place within the domain 
of one jurisdiction only, let alone when an international component comes to play. The 
conduct is trivialized or at least not taken up by the local authorities.  
 but in the light of the expected growth of international 
(cyber)stalking in both size and complexity, international agreement and cooperation on the 
matter do seem necessary.  
To improve the investigation and prosecution of international (cyber)stalking it would 
be a good strategy to encourage harmonisation of laws and to improve international 
collaboration in the field. Given that the authoritatively prescription of rules such as the U.S. 
federal anti-stalking law is impossible within an international context that is governed by state 
sovereignty, it is a good idea to first make sure that national governments are aware of the 
intrusiveness and seriousness of stalking and the detrimental effects that it can have on 
people’s lives.93
                                                 
91 Although it should be noted that cyberstalking does not differ from other cybercrimes in this respect. The 
committee that drafted the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime contends that one of the major 
challenges in combating cybercrime is assessing the extent and impact of the criminal act (Explanatory Report of 
the Convention on Cybercrime, consideration 133). 
 Solid training programs and national campaigns to raise awareness amongst 
local policemen and other criminal justice officials should not be forgotten either. If more 
countries were to criminalize the conduct there would be more bearing power to facilitate 
92 L. Ellison and Y. Akdeniz, ‘Cyber-stalking: The Regulation of Harassment on the Internet’, (1998) spec. ed. 
Criminal Justice and the Internet Criminal Law Review, 29-48. 
93 The mention of stalking as a conduct that should be declared a breach of law by Women Against Violence 
Europe during an expert group meeting of the UN Division for the Advancement of Women is a good start. 
(Issues brief prepared by WAVE (Women Against Violence Europe) Violence against women: Good practices 
in combating and eliminating violence against women, Expert Group Meeting, Organized by: UN Division for 
the Advancement of Women, Vienna, Austria, 17 to 20 May 2005).  
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international investigation and prosecution and, perhaps, even to come to the creation of 
international standards. Although an insertion of the crime of cyberstalking in the Cybercrime 
Convention or the European Arrest Warrant may be a little premature to date, it could become 
an option in the future once stalking forms part of the political agenda. Meanwhile, the 
creation of a Model Code after the American model, would be helpful in harmonizing the 
existent domestic provisions and in inspiring countries that have not criminalized the conduct 
yet. Since the perception of stalking appears to be slowly converging across jurisdictions and 
cultures, the drafting of such a Model Code becomes less and less problematic. After 
analysing many definitions of stalking Groenen found out that stalking always boils down to 
“repetitive behaviour that is unwanted by the person at whom the behaviour is directed”.94
 
 A 
Model Code could depart from this common theme. Given the trend to abolish or at least 
seriously diminish the importance of the ‘fear’-requirement, the Model Code should either 
completely disregard the effect that stalking can have on the individual victim or it should 
take the ‘reasonable person’ as a standard. Finally, from the perspective of the international 
fight against stalking, the current trend of abandoning the principle of dual criminality within 
extradition and legal assistance and the adoption of the principle of ubiquity as a standard for 
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